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Chapter 2 
Cyprus 
 
Nathalie Tocci and Tamara Kovziridze 
 
This chapter reviews the impact of Europeanization on the Cyprus conflict. 
Since 1974, the UN has developed increasingly detailed proposals for a bi-
zonal, bi-communal federation. But throughout the decades of failed 
negotiations the main parties have essentially stuck to their negotiating 
positions. In the 1990s, with Cyprus’ application for EU membership, the EU 
became a key external determinant of the evolution of the conflict. Indeed, 
because of Cyprus’ accession process and Turkey’s own aspirations to join 
the Union, the parties to the conflict equate Europeanization with EU-ization. 
EU-ization in Cyprus has two dimensions: the impact of the EU as a 
framework on conflict resolution efforts, and the impact of the accession 
process on the parties in conflict. The latter dimension of Europeanization has 
had both intended and unintended effects, which in turn are likely to impinge 
on future developments in the eastern Mediterranean. 
 
The existence and persistence of the Cyprus conflict is characterized by a fundamental 
reluctance by all the principal parties involved to re-establish, create or run a unified 
independent Cyprus in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots coexist peacefully on the 
basis of a shared understanding of their political equality. This reluctance is driven by 
the parties’ understanding of how they could each attain their own objectives of self-
determination, individual rights and communal security. Their positions have 
revolved around a legalistic and modernist discourse of absolute sovereignty, 
statehood and military power and balance. Absolute and mutually exclusive positions 
have meant that fulfilling the basic needs of one party entails negating those of the 
other. 
 Cyprus’ EU accession process in the 1990s affected both the incentives and 
the bargaining positions of the principal parties. However, the impact of the accession 
process did not meet the professed expectations of the member states, the 
Commission or the Greek Cypriot government. On the contrary, the major visible 
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development during the 1990s and early 2000s was the hardening of the parties’ 
positions, in particular those of the Turkish Cypriot side. The specific (conditional and 
unconditional) gains and losses presented to the parties, and the way in which they 
were presented by EU actors had unintended effects up until late 2001. This was 
because they fed into the discourse of the most nationalist elements in the conflict, 
legitimizing their hardened positions.  
 By late 2001 the tide seemed to be turning, and the 2002-04 peace efforts 
offered the prospect of a final breakthrough. The approaching deadline of Cyprus’ EU 
accession led both to an unprecedented activism on the part of civil society and 
centre-left forces in northern Cyprus and to open schisms within the Turkish national 
consensus on Cyprus. Particularly since Turkey’s November 2002 elections, different 
‘Ankaras’ voiced different views on the Cyprus question. These divisions were 
closely interconnected with different positions concerning Turkey’s own EU 
accession course, launched after the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. 
Yet despite positive developments on the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sides, these 
were not sufficient to seal an agreement, as evidenced by the April 2004 referendum 
results, in which the overwhelming rejection of the UN Annan Plan by Greek 
Cypriots (by 76% against) prevented the reunification of the island before Cyprus’ EU 
accession on 1 May 2004.  
 
2.1 The historical roots of the conflict: 1930s-1974 
 
The potential for inter-communal conflict in Cyprus dates back to the period of 
Ottoman rule and the emergence of separate communities on the island. The seeds of 
the present dispute were effectively sown, however, during the years of British 
colonial domination in the early 20th century and the years of anti-colonial struggle in 
the 1920s-1950s.  
In the 1920s, the Greek Cypriot community became increasingly dissatisfied 
with British rule in Cyprus. However, unlike with other 20th-century decolonization 
movements, desire for freedom did not lead to a demand for independence. Instead, 
viewing themselves and mainland Greeks as one people, the Greek Cypriots 
expressed their desire for freedom through enosis, or union with Greece.  
 Greece became actively involved in the Cyprus question a decade later. It had 
already declared Cyprus to be an inalienable part of Greece in the early 1920s. But 
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following its catastrophic expedition in Anatolia in 1922, and the ensuing Treaty of 
Friendship between Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Eleftherios Venizelos, Athens set 
aside its irredentist ambitions during the 1920s and 1930s. It began to be actively 
involved in Cyprus in the early 1940s. This involvement initially took the form of 
diplomatic pressure on Britain, followed by mobilization within the UN. However, 
with the failure of Greek diplomacy, the Greek Cypriot movement resorted to armed 
struggle. The EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston) fighters led by Georgios 
Grivas began a guerrilla struggle against the colonial regime, and the first EOKA 
bombs exploded in April 1955. 
 Up until the mid-1950s, the British reacted to demands for enosis through 
force and repression. Internally, the British supported and worked together with the 
Turkish Cypriot anti-enosis struggle. Aware of the potential danger of enosis to the 
Turkish Cypriots, to serve its own colonial aims Britain encouraged the counter-
mobilization of that community. Externally, meanwhile, it highlighted Turkey’s 
strategic interests in Cyprus and its aversion to enosis.  
 Turkish Cypriot concerns about enosis grew during the 1940s, and particularly 
after the 1950 plebiscite in which the Greek Cypriot community unanimously voted in 
favour of it. The Turkish Cypriot élite and the population at large were still relatively 
content with British rule. However, well aware of the discriminatory treatment of the 
Turks/Muslims in former Ottoman areas annexed to Greece, the Turkish Cypriots 
fiercely rejected union with Greece. This spontaneous rejection, nurtured by the 
British, led to a British-Turkish Cypriot front against EOKA in the mid-1950s. In 
1956 the Turkish Cypriots began countering EOKA through the armed movement 
Volkan and then, in 1957, the TMT (Turk Mukavemet Teskilati). By 1957 the Turkish 
Cypriot community and Turkey had formulated their own counter-position to enosis: 
taksim, or partition of the island into Greek and Turkish Cypriot zones. 
 By the late 1950s, the main parties were at loggerheads with each other. The 
Greek Cypriots and Greece were pushing for enosis, while the Turkish Cypriots and 
Turkey responded with demands for taksim. The British, meanwhile, were determined 
to retain full sovereignty of the island. The path for compromise was cleared, 
however, with a shift in the British position in late 1957. The compromise solution 
between the extremes of enosis and taksim was independence. In 1959, a framework 
agreement was worked out in Zurich between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers. 
It was immediately followed by the signature of fully-fledged treaties in London, 
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which were also signed by the British and by Archbishop Makarios and Fazil Kucuk, 
representing the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities respectively. The parties 
agreed on a basic structure for the new, independent Republic of Cyprus (RoC) which 
explicitly ruled out both enosis and taksim. Under the agreement, Britain retained 
sovereignty over the military bases of Dhekelia and Akrotiri.  
 At the same time, the parties also signed Treaties of Guarantee and of 
Alliance. The Treaty of Guarantee was intended to “ensure the independence, 
territorial integrity and security” of the Republic of Cyprus and to prevent its 
“political or economic union with any state whatsoever” (Article 1). In support of this 
aim, the Treaty gave Britain, Greece and Turkey “the right to take action with the sole 
aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the Treaty” (Article 4). The 
three guarantors could intervene in the internal affairs of the island, either jointly or 
independently, to ensure compliance with the Treaty and to prevent both enosis and 
taksim. The Treaty of Alliance was a defence pact to safeguard the independence and 
territorial integrity of the RoC. In its additional protocol, the Treaty allowed Greece 
and Turkey to station 950 and 650 troops, respectively, in Cyprus. It also granted 
Britain extensive rights in its use of the ninety-nine square miles under its 
sovereignty.  
The basic structure of the RoC was laid down in the 1960 Constitution, which 
established a bi-communal partnership Republic, i.e., a hybrid consociational model 
with elements of communal autonomy. Bi-communality was ensured through a 
detailed, complex arrangement providing for community representation and power-
sharing. The executive would be governed according to a presidential system, with a 
Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President elected by the separate 
communities. The executive would also consist of a cabinet of ten members: seven 
members would be Greek Cypriot and appointed by the President, while the 
remaining three would be Turkish Cypriot and appointed by the Vice-President. The 
legislature would consist of a fifty-member House of Representatives elected through 
separate electoral lists. Communal representation would be determined on a 70:30 
ratio, and there would be the same ethnic quota for the civil service and the police 
force. For the 2,000-strong armed forces, however, a 60:40 ratio would apply. The 
judicial system would consist of a Supreme Constitutional Court, a High Court of 
Justice and lower courts also characterized by bi-communal representation. Separate 
communal chambers would be set up to deal with educational, religious, cultural and 
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personal status matters. The communal chambers would be entitled to levy taxes and 
establish separate courts to administer these powers, and to receive direct subsidies 
from their respective ‘motherlands’. Finally, in each of the island’s five largest towns 
there would be separate municipalities for the two communities. 
 Almost from the outset, many Greek Cypriots expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the agreements, regarding them as a betrayal of the enosis cause. Makarios felt 
they had been imposed from outside. Most importantly, the Greek Cypriots contested 
what they believed to be the over-generous concessions granted to the Turkish 
Cypriot community relative to their size. In their view, the Turkish Cypriots, who 
represented 18% of the island’s population, should have been granted minority rights 
rather than an almost equal share in government arrangements. Hence, on 3 
November 1963 President Makarios presented Vice-President Kucuk with a thirteen-
point proposal for amending the Constitution. The amendments proposed the abolition 
of several critical constitutional provisions that characterized the bi-communal nature 
of the Republic. They set the stage for a unitary, centralized state with minority rights 
(at most) for the Turkish Cypriot community.  
 Ankara and Vice-President Fazil Kucuk rejected the proposed amendments. 
Tensions within public institutions grew until Turkish Cypriot officials either left or 
were made to leave all public positions. At the same time, violence broke out between 
communal paramilitary groups. Paramilitary organizations were initially defensive in 
nature, but as tension mounted they adopted more aggressive positions. The outbreak 
of inter-communal violence between the Greek Cypriot police force and the Turkish 
Resistance Movement, and between Greek and Turkish Cypriot paramilitary groups, 
led to numerous deaths and the forced displacement of over 30,000 Turkish Cypriots 
from mixed villages to enclaves. The (Greek Cypriot) government imposed an 
economic embargo on strategic goods and services to the enclaves, it directed no 
public expenditure to the Turkish Cypriot community living in enclaves, restricted the 
latter’s freedom of movement and denied it most forms of employment.  
 The problem intensified with Greece’s efforts to destabilize Makarios’ 
government. Tensions between Greece and Cyprus had been exacerbated following 
the 1967 military coup in Greece and the growing Greek interference in the internal 
affairs of the island. It culminated on 15 July 1974 when the Greek National Guard 
staged a coup to oust the Archbishop’s regime and extend the dictatorship to Cyprus.  
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 At this point, Turkey, which had already been on the verge of intervening in 
1964 and 1967 in response to inter-communal violence, intervened militarily on 20 
July 1974, invoking its rights under the Treaty of Guarantee. The army initially took 
control of a narrow, ten-mile strip of coastline around Kyrenia, which was then joined 
to the triangular enclave of land under Turkish Cypriot control. After the first attack, 
the parties met in Geneva in August 1974. They agreed on an exchange of prisoners 
and UN protection for the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
sides proposed a bi-zonal federal system as a take-it-or-leave-it solution. When acting 
President Glafcos Clerides asked for an adjournment of 36-48 hours for consultations, 
Turkey attacked a second time and took control of 37% of the island’s territory.  
 During and immediately after the first Turkish military intervention EC 
member states in the framework of European Political Cooperation made a set of 
démarches in Athens and Ankara calling for ceasefire and supporting negotiations in 
Geneva. Internal European divisions however blocked EPC during and after the 
second invasion. Between the first and the second Turkish attacks, the Greek junta 
collapsed and the new premier Constantine Karamanlis immediately voiced the 
intention to apply for EC membership. The pro-European regime in Athens and the 
Turkish occupation of over one third of the island in turn made member states such as 
France more supportive of the Greek Cypriot side. Other member states like Germany 
and the UK preferred to retain an even-handed approach towards Greece and Turkey. 
As a result, since 1974 the EC refrained from active collective involvement in conflict 
resolution efforts. 
 
2.2 The evolution of the conflict since 1974 
 
Following their intervention, the Turkish troops remained in Cyprus and the 1960 
constitutional order was not restored. Instead, a radically different order emerged, 
with the Turkish Cypriots now controlling 37% of the island, including 57% of the 
coastline. This territory included 70% of the island’s economic potential, with over 
50% of its industrial enterprises, 60% of natural resources, 65% of the total cultivated 
land and 73% of the tourist infrastructure. The intervention and the ensuing Vienna 
agreements on population exchange in April/May 1975 led to the displacement of 
140-160,000 Greek Cypriots from the north and 60,000 Turkish Cypriots from the 
south. Both areas were almost entirely ethnically cleansed. Only 13,000 Greek 
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Cypriots remained in northern Cyprus, living in the isolated Karpass Peninsula. 
Furthermore, since partition Turkey has encouraged immigration to northern Cyprus 
from the mainland, and today the number of Turkish immigrants ranges between 
40,000 and 80,000.1 Property formerly belonging to Greek Cypriots was nationalized 
and distributed to Turkish Cypriots, through certificates of usufruct, on the basis of 
property lost in the south. As a result, the return or compensation of properties 
became one of the major sticking points on the conflict settlement agenda.  
 Since 1974 Cyprus has been divided into two distinct zones. In the north, the 
Turkish Cypriot community first declared the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 
1975, and in 1983 declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The 
international community – excluding Turkey – condemned this unilateral declaration 
of independence (UDI) as a secessionist act against the spirit of conflict resolution.2 In 
the south, the Greek Cypriots retained the title of the RoC. With the exception of 
Turkey, the international community continued to view the RoC as the only legitimate 
authority on the island despite the absence of Turkish Cypriots there. 
 
Table 2.1: Cyprus – population and ethnicity* 
  
1960 
 
2000 
Total 572,000 757,000 
Greek Cypriots 441,500 630,500 
Turkish Cypriots 104,000 210,000 
Other 26,500 75,000 
 
* The last official census in Cyprus was in 1960. Figures since then have been hotly disputed. The 
2001 Commission Progress Report states that in 2000 the population of the island was 757,000 
(including both northern and southern Cyprus). The RoC authorities claim that this figure includes 
630,500 Greek Cypriots, 9,000 Maronites, Armenians and Latins and 66,000 resident workers. RoC 
statistics claim that only 87,600 Turkish Cypriots reside in Cyprus, while 115,000 Turkish settlers 
immigrated from Turkey. TRNC statistics, claim that the number of Cyprus-born Turkish Cypriot 
citizens and Turkish immigrants with TRNC citizenship stands at 210,000. 
                                               
1 Figures on the numbers of Turkish immigrants vary enormously, with Greek Cypriot sources citing 
around 115,000 Turkish settlers and Turkish Cypriot sources arguing that not more than 40,000 of the 
population was born in Turkey. 
2 UN General Assembly Resolution 5412 (1983), UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 
(1984) and Council of Europe Resolution 1056 (1987). 
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The partition of the island led to a consolidation of conflict, with the evolution of two 
very different economic, political and social systems and polities.3 The first divisive 
condition was the existence of the formally recognised RoC governing the Greek 
Cypriot community alongside the de facto but unrecognized TRNC, governing the 
Turkish Cypriot community. Over the years, as the conflict showed no signs of 
settlement, the latter went from being an administration that had served the enclaved 
Turkish Cypriots in 1967-1974 to declaring independence in 1983. The present 
situation has greatly exacerbated the division between the two peoples by precluding 
any experience of joint governance and the development of a joint political culture.  
The second divisive condition has been the almost complete lack of any 
social, cultural or economic links between the two communities. Because of separate 
governance, and above all the ‘Green Line’ (dividing the two communities in separate 
zones since the 1974 partition of the island), contact between the two sides has been 
virtually non-existent. In the social and cultural spheres, links between the 
communities have been inhibited by territorial separation, while in the economic 
sphere, the embargo imposed on the north by the RoC destroyed almost all the 
economic links that had existed through trade and joint business. New generations of 
Cypriots grew up without any form of contact with the other community. This in turn 
encouraged radical political views based on bias and prejudice. The media and 
education systems exacerbated this situation by reminding young generations of the 
injustices and atrocities of the past. In this context it may be interesting to note some 
of the results of a poll carried out in March 2000 in the RoC. Seventy-five per cent of 
the Greek Cypriots interviewed said that they would not agree to a marriage between 
a member of their family and a Turkish Cypriot. Over 80 per cent said that in the 
event of a federal solution they would not live in the Turkish Cypriot zone. Finally, 
between 30 and 40 per cent of interviewees were opposed to working in the same 
place as a Turkish Cypriot, living in a mixed village or allowing their children to 
attend the same schools as Turkish Cypriot children. Figures on the Turkish Cypriot 
side would probably paint an even bleaker picture, given that the fear of coexistence 
is even more marked within the smaller Turkish Cypriot community. 
                                               
3 For further detail on this aspect see Nathalie Tocci “Self-determination in Cyprus: Future Options 
within a European Order”, in Bruno Coppieters and Richard Sakwa (eds), Contextualizing Secession: 
Normative Analysis in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: OUP, 2003), pp.71-96. 
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 The situation changed in April 2003 when, following the failure of UN-led 
negotiations, the Turkish Cypriot side opened the Green Line. There was a huge 
influx of people across the border, with largely positive consequences. Young 
generations of Greek and Turkish Cypriots have experienced that contact does not 
automatically entail violence, and that coexistence is possible. Yet at the same time 
important elements of division remain. On the Greek Cypriot side, seeing the 
comparative poverty in northern Cyprus and watching Turkish Cypriots crossing the 
border to buy food and consumer goods in the prosperous south consolidated the 
vision of the ‘impoverished Other’. Some Greek Cypriots resented having to show 
their documents to Turkish Cypriot authorities when crossing the border. On the 
Turkish Cypriot side, resentment mounted over the obstacles to intra-island trade 
erected by the Greek Cypriot government, despite their nominal acceptance of this 
confidence-building measure. Turkish Cypriots have also resented the restrictions 
imposed by the Greek Cypriot side on the overnight stay of foreigners in northern 
Cyprus.  
 The third condition fostering division is the economic disparity between the 
two communities. After 1974, while the Greek Cypriot economy in the south 
underwent a vigorous recovery, leading to economic prosperity, the Turkish Cypriot 
economy in the northern region stagnated.4 The Greek Cypriot economic success was 
facilitated by the status of the RoC as the only internationally recognized state on the 
island. As a small economy it benefited hugely from trade and investment, 
specializing in light manufacturing goods, tourism and offshore financial services. 
Northern Cyprus presents a starkly contrasting scenario. Agriculture remains largely 
subsistence-based, and tourism is under-exploited mainly owing to the lack of 
international air links from places other than Turkey. The economy is dominated by 
an inefficient public sector, leading to serious fiscal imbalances. The stagnation in the 
economy is exacerbated – if not largely caused – by the lack of international 
recognition. The close ties between northern Cyprus and Turkey have not only been 
insufficient to offset the costs of international isolation5 – they have also meant that 
                                               
4 The economy of northern Cyprus is marked by the existence of significant unrecorded economic 
activity. Real figures are thus higher that those reported in statistics for northern Cyprus. On this see 
Clement Dodd (ed.), The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus 
(Huntingdon: Eothen, 1993). 
5 In 1998, Turkey formed an Association Council with the TRNC providing for close links in trade, 
political solidarity and budgetary support. 
  10
northern Cyprus has inherited Turkey’s economic ills, further hampering trade and 
investment, and thus overall growth, in the north.  
 Economic disparities have meant radically different ways of life and standards 
of living, hindering inter-communal relations. In addition, they have heightened 
concerns about reunification amongst the Turkish Cypriot people, who fear the 
economic domination of northern Cyprus by the prosperous Greek Cypriots. This fear 
explains why one of the principal items on the conflict settlement agenda is the 
liberalization of the freedoms of movement, settlement and property. The Greek 
Cypriot community, wishing to return to the north, demands the liberalization of the 
three freedoms. The Turkish Cypriot community rejects their demands, arguing that if 
these freedoms were fully liberalized, northern Cyprus would be ‘bought up’ by the 
richer Greek Cypriot community, thereby threatening the communal survival of the 
Turkish Cypriots.  
 The last cause of division between the two communities is the underlying 
conflict between their respective kin-states, Greece and Turkey. Since the Ottoman 
conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the ensuing four centuries of Ottoman rule 
over Greece, which ended with the Greek war of independence in 1821-29, tensions 
between the two nations have been high. Rivalries were reinforced in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the wars of 1897, 1912-13 and 1919-23, 
and again after 1974 by conflicts over sovereignty rights in the Aegean. To the extent 
that the two Cypriot communities identify with their respective ‘motherlands’, Greek-
Turkish rivalry hinders the creation of shared or coexisting identities in Cyprus.  
The situation has improved since the seeds of a Greek-Turkish rapprochement 
were sown during the spring and summer of 1999. The Greek Foreign Minister 
George Papandreou, in particular, increasingly felt the need to engage in constructive 
dialogue with arch-enemy Turkey, following a period of increasing brinkmanship 
between the two countries in 1996-99. The earthquakes in Greece and Turkey in 
August-September 1999, and the mutual support between the two countries in the 
wake of these humanitarian crises, provided the pretext for a major policy shift. The 
earthquake diplomacy led to the groundbreaking reciprocal visits of foreign ministers 
Ismail Cem and George Papandreou to each other’s countries in January-February 
2000. Rapprochement steadily filtered through the system. By the autumn of 2002, 
Greece and Turkey had signed ten bilateral agreements on ‘low politics’ issues. 
Regarding Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean, despite the absence of concrete 
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agreements, since March 2002 the parties have engaged in talks on the continental 
shelf. The rapprochement should be hailed as one of the most positive developments 
in the Cyprus conflict since 1960. It remains fragile, however, and a crisis in Cyprus 
or the Aegean could still endanger the process.  
 Hence, while the initial causes of the conflict are rooted in the decades 
preceding 1974, the conflict has been sustained by the divisive conditions that have 
emerged since then. Real and imaginary political, geopolitical, social and economic 
divisions have led to support for rigid negotiating positions by the two community 
leaderships, preventing the materialization of a lasting and comprehensive agreement.  
 
2.3 The history of negotiations and attempted solutions 
 
Successive rounds of negotiations since 1974 have amounted to little more than a few 
superficial and inconsequential successes and a myriad of failures. The parties, at 
different times and to different degrees, rejected international proposals, refusing to 
alter their negotiating positions in any meaningful way. Yet at the same time the 
international community, embodied mainly by the UN Secretariat, became 
increasingly precise as to what the contours of a settlement would look like. In other 
words, over time the proposals did not deviate significantly from one another, but 
rather built on each other. They also remained based on the political concepts 
underpinning the 1960 Constitution. Over the years, international mediators fine-
tuned their proposals, adapting them to the increasingly refined positions of the 
principal parties and attempting to square the circle between their incompatible 
positions by taking account of underlying basic needs.   
 The only concrete steps forward came shortly after partition. UN Security 
Council (UNSC) Resolution 367 of 1975 proposed a solution based on an 
independent, sovereign, bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. A federation would 
take into account the post-1974 situation, while respecting the independence of 
Cyprus as advocated in UNSC resolutions.  
 UNSC Resolution 367 paved the way for the high-level agreements of 1977 
between Rauf Denktash and Archbishop Makarios and those of 1979 between 
Denktash and Spyros Kyprianou. The 1977 agreement established four main 
guidelines for a settlement: it would be based on an independent, bi-communal and 
non-aligned federation. Territorial readjustments would take into account the 
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economic viability of the entities involved and communal land ownership. Provisions 
on the ‘three freedoms’ of movement, settlement and property would be included in 
the agreement, and the federal government would ensure the unity of the country. The 
1979 agreement stipulated ten further points: a settlement would be reached via inter-
communal talks and would address human rights and freedoms on the island. It would 
also provide for the resettlement of 35,000 Greek Cypriot refugees in a demilitarized 
Varosha, the now uninhabited and formerly developed tourist resort area bordering 
the town of Famagusta. No action would be taken which could jeopardize the peace 
process. The international community still upholds the high-level agreements, but 
their substance is so general that it could accommodate almost any negotiating 
position.  
The impossibility of achieving a compromise was determined largely by the 
fact that for decades the main parties had been defending mutually exclusive 
negotiating positions on the key issues. The main differences between the two parties 
can be highlighted by briefly analysing their positions on four issues: sovereignty, 
political equality, territory and security – positions that have not fundamentally 
changed since 1974. The Turkish Cypriot vision emphasizes the necessity for separate 
sovereignty. In practice, this means that a federal state would emerge from the 
aggregation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sovereign federated states. Only a 
federation by aggregation would ensure political equality between the two 
communities. The sovereign and largely self-governing cantons would then delegate 
limited powers to the centre. The Greek Cypriot leadership also accepts the concept of 
a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, but it emphasizes the single and indivisible 
sovereignty of the RoC, which would disaggregate through constitutional change.  
 Interpretations of political equality have also differed significantly. To the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership the sacrosanct principle of political equality means 
equality between the two federated states, coordination rather than subordination 
between the federated states and the federal level, and equality of the two 
communities within the federal level through widespread unanimity of decision-
making and numerical equality. To the Greek Cypriots, the reluctantly accepted 
principle of political equality predominantly entails equality between the two 
federated states. The 1989 Greek Cypriot proposals essentially rejected the equality of 
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the federated states vis-à-vis the centre.6 The federated states would have only a 
limited set of regional powers. At the centre, the key principles would be those of 
proportionality and majority rule. As current President Tassos Papadopoulous put it: 
“political equality can only be achieved within the confines of one state, one 
sovereignty and one citizenship”.7 
 The prism of absolute sovereignty has also led to contrasting positions on 
territory, Turkish immigrants and the three freedoms of movement, settlement and 
property. The Turkish Cypriot leadership demanded a territory large enough to be 
economically self-sufficient and thus sustain Turkish Cypriot sovereignty. This 
concept was rejected by the Greek Cypriot side, to whom territorial boundaries would 
not divide two sovereign entities. According to the Greek Cypriots, the boundary 
should take into account the demographic balance on the island. Effectively following 
the same demographic logic, the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected the Greek 
Cypriot demand for the repatriation of Turkish immigrants. To the Greek Cypriots, 
the three freedoms of movement, settlement and property should be liberalized 
because the Cypriots, as the ultimate repositories of the single sovereignty of the state, 
should enjoy equal rights throughout the island. The Turkish Cypriots rejected this 
position, insisting on their right to separate, sovereign self-rule. Cyprus, in their view, 
is composed of two sovereign peoples, not one.  
 Differing perceptions of security threats have also led to contrasting positions 
on external guarantees. To the Turkish Cypriots, within a system of two sovereign 
entities, Turkey alone could protect the security of the smaller Turkish Cypriot state 
from the larger Greek Cypriot community. To the Greek Cypriots, however, the main 
security threat is posed by Turkey itself rather than by the Turkish Cypriots. Hence 
their calls for demilitarization and resistance to Turkey’s interference in Cyprus. 
Thwarted by mutually exclusive positions, domestic and international efforts 
made since the high-level agreements went through an unending series of failures. In 
what follows we briefly recount the history of negotiations and proposed solutions 
since 1974. Following the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, UN Special 
Representative Hugo Gobbi mediated inter-communal negotiations in the period 
                                               
6 Republic of Cyprus, “Outline Proposals for the Establishment of a Federal Republic and for the 
Resolution of the Cyprus Problem”, submitted on 30 January 1989, Appendix 20, in Republic of 
Cyprus, The Cyprus Problem, Historical Review and the Latest Developments (Nicosia: Information 
Office, Republic of Cyprus, 1999).  
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between 1980 and 1983. Gobbi’s mediation ultimately failed when in May 1983 the 
RoC, supported by Greece, brought its case to the UN General Assembly and secured 
Resolution 37/253 in favour of the immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces. 
Frustrated by the Greek Cypriot advantages deriving from recognized statehood, the 
Turkish Cypriots responded with their unilateral declaration of independence in 
November.8 In response, the Greek Cypriot team left the negotiations and rejected the 
UN Interim Agreement.  
 Talks resumed in Vienna in August 1984. The UN drafted three agreements 
under Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in 1984-86 (the 1984 Working 
Points, the 1985 Integrated Documents and the 1986 Draft Framework Agreement). 
The proposals suggested a federation consisting of two provinces, with the Turkish 
Cypriot province amounting to 23-30% of the island. The legislature would have two 
houses. The lower house would be governed either by proportional representation or 
by a 70:30 ratio (as per the 1960 Constitution). The executive would be a presidential 
system, which would either follow the 1960 Constitution (with a Greek Cypriot 
President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President) and a 60:40 ratio in the cabinet, or 
would involve a rotating presidency and a 70:30 ratio in the cabinet. The federal level 
would be responsible for foreign and security policies, federal finance, monetary 
policy, infrastructure and social policy. The two provinces would have the residual 
competences. Talks also covered the ‘three freedoms’, the withdrawal of Turkish 
troops, the resettlement of Varosha and the reopening of Nicosia airport. The Turkish 
Cypriot side accepted the first and third draft agreements for a federal settlement, but 
both Papandreou and Kyprianou rejected them.  
 There was a greater sense of optimism when talks were re-launched in Geneva 
in August 1988 between Rauf Denktash and the newly elected Greek Cypriot 
President, Vassiliou, who was viewed as considerably more moderate than his 
predecessor Kyprianou. In July 1989, Pérez de Cuellar presented his ideas for a 
settlement. The ideas provided for a new ‘common home’ for the two communities, 
whose relationship would be not of majority and minority but rather of political 
equality. There would be a new constitution, which would set up a single, bi-zonal 
                                                                                                                                      
7 Debate between Nicos Anastasiades, Demetris Christofias and Tassos Papadopoulos, in Cyprus 
College, Nicosia, 11 March 2002. 
8 According to a Turkish minister at the time, the UDI was intended not as a permanent measure but 
rather as a means of shifting the balance of opinion within the UN in favour of political equality for the 
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and bi-communal federal Cyprus. The new state would have a single international 
personality and citizenship, but it would embody the political equality of the two 
communities. The single sovereignty of the federal state would in fact ‘emanate 
equally’ from the two communities. Negotiations on the basis of the Secretary-
General’s ideas continued into 1990 and culminated in a summit in March 1990. The 
summit failed when Denktash demanded the right of separate self-determination and 
was turned down by Vassiliou.9 Nevertheless, Security Council Resolution 649 called 
for an agreement negotiated on an equal footing by the two parties, based on the 
Secretary-General’s ideas. It also called the parties to ‘refrain from any action that 
could aggravate the situation’ (article 5).  
Notwithstanding the Security Council’s appeal, the RoC applied for EC 
membership on 4 July 1990. The Turkish Cypriot authorities reacted harshly to the 
application. Following the application and the Commission’s positive Opinion in 
1993, the ‘EU’ as a collective actor (that despite its 1972 Association agreement with 
Cyprus had never played a significant role in peace efforts) gradually became an 
integral element of the dynamics of the conflict.  
Notwithstanding the RoC’s application for EC membership, the 1990-1993 
period witnessed persisting and intense UN mediation efforts. In October 1991, 
UNSC resolution 716 reaffirmed the principle of a single Cyprus based on the 
communities’ political equality.10 Two months later, the UNSG’s report stated that 
“the framework of a settlement has become clear (...) [and] sovereignty will be 
equally shared but indivisible”; the solution would be based on a ‘new constitutional 
arrangement’ which would be negotiated on an ‘equal footing’ and approved through 
‘separate referenda’.11 In early 1992, the new UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros 
Ghali immediately picked up the Cyprus dossier from where his predecessor had left 
off. The process culminated in 1992 with a fully fledged UN proposal for a 
settlement, known as the ‘Set of Ideas’. The UN Security Council endorsed the 
document in Resolution 750 of 10 April 1992.  
 The ‘Set of Ideas’ fleshed out in greater detail previous UN ideas and 
proposals for a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, which had in turn drawn on the 
                                                                                                                                      
Turkish Cypriot community – as indeed appeared to be the case in the 1984-86 negotiations and in the 
1992 Set of Ideas. Interview conducted in Istanbul, May 2002. 
9 Interview with Greek Cypriot negotiator in 1989, Nicosia, March 2002. 
10 UN Security Council Resolution 716 (S/23121 08/10/91), paragraphs 4 and 6. 
11 Report of the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council (S/23300 19/12/91), paragraph 6. 
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high-level agreements and the 1960 accords. Cyprus would be the common home of 
the two politically equal communities. The principle of political equality was 
formalized by stating that “one community cannot claim sovereignty over the other 
community”12 and that “the federal Government cannot encroach upon the powers 
and functions of the two federated states”.13 The federation would have a single 
international personality, citizenship and sovereignty. However, sovereignty would 
emanate equally from the two communities and each federated state would be 
administered by one community, in accordance with its own constitution. At the 
centre, there would be a President and a Vice-President, one from each community. 
There would be a federal council with a 7:3 communal ratio, taking decisions by 
majority vote. There would be a bicameral legislature (with a ratio of 70:30 in the 
lower chamber and 50:50 in the upper chamber). For decisions in the spheres of 
foreign affairs and defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship, 
parliamentary approval could necessitate separate majorities of both communities in 
both houses.  
 The Set of Ideas entrusted the central level with considerable power over 
foreign policy, defence, policing, customs, trade, monetary policy, citizenship and 
immigration as well as standards on public health, the environment, the preservation 
of natural resources, and weights and measures. The centre would also be responsible 
for airports and ports, communications, patents and trademarks. All remaining areas, 
such as transport, industry, R&D, tourism, agriculture, education and culture, would 
be sub-state competences. The federated states would also be responsible for security 
and law and order within their territories, through separate police forces and 
judiciaries. Both the central and the federated state levels would have separate 
budgets and powers of taxation.  
 Concerning refugee return and the liberalization of the three freedoms, the Set 
of Ideas proposed that whereas the freedom of movement would be freely exercised, 
other rights and freedoms would be restricted by certain conditions. In particular, a set 
of conditions governed the return to or settlement in northern Cyprus by Greek 
Cypriots. The result would ensure that each community had a clear majority of the 
population and land ownership in their federated state. Those displaced persons who 
                                               
12 UN Secretary-General, “Set of Ideas for the Reunification of Cyprus” (S/24472 English, 1992), 
pt.11. 
13 UN Secretary-General, “Set of Ideas for the Reunification of Cyprus” (S/24472 English, 1992) pt.21. 
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did not wish to, or who could not, return to their former properties would be 
adequately compensated. The Set of Ideas also envisaged a map which reduced the 
Turkish Cypriot zone to approximately 28% of the territory. People affected by the 
territorial adjustments could either remain in their homes or be relocated to the 
Turkish Cypriot federated state. Finally, concerning security, the Set of Ideas included 
demilitarization as a long-term objective. In the meantime there would be a numerical 
balance between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot troops and equipment on the one hand 
and Greek and Greek Cypriot troops and equipment on the other. The Treaties of 
Guarantee and Alliance would remain in force.  
 The Greek Cypriot team under Vassiliou accepted the Set of Ideas as a basis 
for negotiation. The Turkish Cypriot side endorsed ninety-one out of the one hundred 
points in the document. Nevertheless the talks finally ended in November 1992 with 
the Secretary-General concluding that the peace process was suffering from a ‘deep 
crisis of confidence’ between the parties. Furthermore, in February 1993 George 
Vassiliou lost the presidential election to the (then) more hardline Glafcos Clerides, 
who rejected the Set of Ideas. Direct talks on final status were stalled until 1997.  
Yet in the meantime Cyprus’ accession process steadily proceeded. At the 
1994 Corfu European Council the Union decided to include Cyprus (and Malta) in the 
future round of enlargement. In 1995 the General Affairs Council decided to open 
accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the completion of the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference. In 1997 the Commission document ‘Agenda 2000’ 
stated that accession negotiations could begin with the Republic of Cyprus despite the 
persistence of the conflict.  
 In view of the prospect of opening accession negotiations between the divided 
Cyprus and the EU, inter-communal negotiations were relaunched in July 1997 in 
Troutbeck, New York, when the UN tabled a proposal which – like the 1992 Set of 
Ideas – proposed a federal state with single sovereignty emanating equally from the 
two communities, with single international personality and citizenship, and composed 
of two federated states with identical powers. At the Troutbeck meeting, the Greek 
Cypriot team rejected the formulation of sovereignty ‘emanating equally’ from both 
communities. The talks were reconvened in August 1997 in Glion, Switzerland. They 
failed, this time because of the Turkish Cypriot position. With the failure of the talks 
and the opening of EU accession negotiations between the RoC and the EU, Rauf 
Denktash refused further direct talks.  
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 To break the impasse in 1999, the UN Security Council called for the 
launching of proximity talks,14 and between December 1999 and November 2000 five 
rounds were held under UN auspices. What became clear, round after round, was that 
these proximity talks were making little progress even towards opening direct talks, 
let alone towards a settlement. Indeed the UNSG later defined the process as one of 
‘procedural wrangling’, ‘verbal gymnastics’ and ‘shadow boxing’.15 UN Special 
Representative Alvaro de Soto engaged in shuttle diplomacy between the sides and 
worked on a set of bridging ideas. Their substance was disclosed in the form of ‘oral 
remarks’ in November 2000. In December 2000 the Turkish Cypriot side unilaterally 
abandoned the talks, and the peace process was once again plunged into deadlock. 
The December 1999 Helsinki European Council had stated that Cyprus’ accession 
could occur without a settlement on the island. The scene appeared set for the EU 
accession of a divided island.  
 Yet, in November 2001, in an unexpected turnaround in the Turkish Cypriot 
position, Rauf Denktash invited Glafcos Clerides for a ‘heart-to-heart’ talk in northern 
Nicosia. Reciprocal dinner invitations set the stage for a restart of direct talks. Talks, 
in the presence of Alvaro de Soto, began in January 2002. They were intended to lead 
to a comprehensive agreement by June 2002, a deadline that would allow the 
December 2002 Copenhagen European Council to invite the whole island into the EU. 
Yet as the successive rounds of talks proceeded, a growing mood of pessimism 
pervaded the negotiations. The June deadline was missed and by the summer of 2002 
the process seemed deadlocked. The publication of a UN Plan (hereafter ‘Annan 
Plan’) in November 2002 injected new life into the process, as it provided a 
comprehensive proposal to reunify the island within the EU. The parties nonetheless 
failed to reach an agreement by the successive deadlines of 13 December 2002 (i.e., at 
the Copenhagen European Council when Cyprus was invited to join the Union), 28 
February 2003, 11 March 2003 and then, finally, during the peace process re-launched 
in February-April 2004.  
What were the principal features of the Annan Plan? Three versions were 
presented in November 2002 and March 2003. Two additional versions were 
                                               
14 Proximity talks are a process in which, rather than negotiating with each other, the parties present 
and discuss their positions with a third-party mediator, e.g., the UN Special Representative, who 
shuttles back and forth between the two sides.   
15 UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 7 
April 2003, paragraph 23. 
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presented in March 2003. While the Plans differed marginally from each other, in 
what follows reference is made to the fifth and final version of the Annan Plan. 
Constitutionally, the Plan adopted several aspects of the Swiss and Belgian federal 
constitutions. Sovereignty would be shared and would not lie exclusively with one 
level of government. Instead, both levels would ‘sovereignly’ exercise the powers 
granted to them by the Constitution in a non-hierarchical fashion. The ‘sovereign’ 
exercise of powers was inspired by the previous UN stipulation that sovereignty 
would ‘emanate equally’ from the two sides. Most powers would be attributed to the 
constituent states, which would coordinate policies in their spheres of competence. In 
this respect the Annan Plan envisaged a looser common state than that put forward in 
the Set of Ideas. However it should be noted that, unlike federal arrangements such as 
those of Belgium, the Annan Plan (like the Set of Ideas) does not allow federated 
states to conclude international treaties in their domestic spheres of competence. In 
federal structures composed of several ethnic or linguistic communities, treaty-
making power is one of the ways to acknowledge, through the constitution, the right 
of these communities to national self-determination. 
 Federal institutions would be marked by effective political equality between 
the parties in a manner that built upon previous proposals but also differed from them 
in important respects. Rather than a presidency (as in the 1960 constitution and past 
UN proposals), there would be a Presidential Council comprising nine members 
(including at least two Turkish Cypriot voting members, and one Turkish Cypriot 
non-voting member), within which there would be a rotating Presidency (with a 
President and a Vice-President from different constituent states, rotating every twenty 
months).  The idea of a presidential council (modelled on the Swiss constitution) was 
an ingenious way of escaping the deadlock between the parties on whether there 
should be a rotating presidency. The Annan Plan took up the idea of rotation, called 
for by the Turkish Cypriot side, but by introducing the idea of a presidential council it 
diminished the importance of the rotating presidency, thus taking Greek Cypriot 
concerns into account.  
 The presidential council would strive to reach decisions by consensus (if the 
council fails to reach decisions by consensus it would decide by majority vote). The 
federal parliament, on the other hand, would be composed of two houses, and 
decisions would require the approval of both chambers by simple majority. Hence, 
unlike in the Set of Ideas, minority blocking power was not envisaged in the Plan at 
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either the executive or the legislative level. However, for specified matters a two-
fifths majority of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot Senators – in addition to a simple 
majority – would be required. The Supreme Court would be represented by an equal 
number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots and would serve as a dispute-resolving 
mechanism if federal institutions became deadlocked. Elections would be based on 
constituent state citizenship for the lower house and on permanent residency for the 
constituent state legislature. In the Senate, instead, representation would be based on 
community affiliation (i.e., there would be an equal number of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots).  
 The constitutional aspect (which in important respects, albeit not all, came 
closer to meeting Turkish Cypriot concerns than previous UN proposals) was 
counterbalanced by territorial proposals which provided for a reduction of the 
northern zone to approximately 28.5% of the land (including the transfer of 
approximately 50% of the territory of the British sovereign bases predominantly to the 
Greek Cypriot state). Territorial readjustments in turn would allow some 90,000 
Greek Cypriot displaced persons to return to their properties under Greek Cypriot 
rule. The remaining Greek Cypriot displaced persons who wished to return to the 
north would have the right to the reinstatement of one-third of the value and one-third 
of the area of their total property within three to five years. They would receive 
compensation for the remaining two-thirds. They would not be entitled to 
reinstatement if their properties were currently occupied by other displaced persons or 
had been significantly improved (in which case they would receive compensation 
instead).  
 In terms of military security, there would be an equal number (6,000) of Greek 
and Turkish troops until 2011, to be scaled down to 3,000 by 2018 (or by the date of 
Turkey’s EU membership). Thereafter, figures would be scaled down to 950 and 650 
for the Greek and Turkish contingents respectively (as provided for in the 1959 Treaty 
of Alliance), with complete demilitarization as the objective. A UN peace-keeping 
force, empowered by a new mandate, would monitor the implementation of the 
agreement. The Treaty of Guarantee would remain in force and the guarantors would 
defend the constitutional status and territorial integrity not only of the United Cyprus 
Republic, but also of the two constituent states. The UN Plan further stipulated that 
Cyprus would not put its territory at the disposal of international military operations 
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without the consent of both constituent states and of both Greece and Turkey until the 
accession of Turkey to the EU. 
 The Plan, with its thousands of pages of draft federal laws, international 
agreements and treaties, represented the most detailed – and the only comprehensive – 
attempt by the UN to advance a settlement since 1960. The Plan was based on the 
1992 Set of Ideas, which in turn built on previous proposals dating back to the 1977 
and 1979 high-level agreements and the 1960 constitution. As such, the UN Plan 
inevitably retained some of the vagueness inherent in previous proposals, particularly 
regarding questions of state sovereignty. The Set of Ideas had proposed ‘indivisible’ 
sovereignty that would ‘emanate equally’ from the two communities. The Annan Plan 
likewise fudged the question of sovereignty by speaking about the constituent states 
‘sovereignly’ exercising their powers.16 The Annan Plan also kept an aura of 
vagueness over the question of state succession. Would the new Cyprus result from 
the aggregation of the RoC and the TRNC or from a change in the RoC’s 
constitution? In other words, the location of the original constituent power was left 
unspecified. This appeared to be the only way to square the circle between the 
mutually exclusive positions of the parties.  
 
2.4 The impact of Europeanization on the Cyprus conflict 
 
The impact of Europeanization on conflict settlement and resolution in Cyprus has 
two important dimensions to it. The first relates to the EU framework, into which a 
unified Cyprus was expected to enter. How was the EU framework utilized by UN 
mediators when drafting bridging proposals? The second relates to the impact of the 
EU accession process on the domestic parties in the Cyprus conflict. The value of the 
EU framework for conflict settlement and resolution in Cyprus translates from 
potential into actual to the extent that it is appreciated domestically by the main 
parties to the conflict. Only if the latter view the EU framework as a valuable asset 
can it add important resources to peace efforts.  
 Let us start with the first dimension. The RoC applied unilaterally for EU 
membership in 1990. Following a positive Commission Opinion in 1993, the 
Republic embarked on an accession process. It did so heedless of the opposition of 
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Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the scepticism (at least up until the late 
1990s) of the large majority of the Turkish Cypriot population. Yet by the late 1990s, 
and in particular following the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the island was set to 
enter the Union in 2004. Particularly during the 2002 direct talks, the parties were 
well aware that in December 2002 the European Council in Copenhagen would admit 
Cyprus into the Union. UN mediators therefore crafted the Annan Plan with the aim 
of embedding a loose, common state within the EU. How did they use the provisions 
and characteristics of the EU framework to draft a more palatable proposal?  
 In relation to constitutional questions it is important to differentiate between 
the mechanisms aimed at the domestic coordination of European issues and the 
representation of these domestic positions at the EU level. The Annan Plan aimed to 
make a settlement within the EU more appealing to the sceptical Turkish Cypriot side 
by endorsing the Belgian model of domestic coordination on EU matters. The Plan 
stated that: “constituent states shall participate in the formulation and implementation 
of policy in external and EU relations on matters within their sphere of competence in 
accordance with Cooperation agreements modeled on the Belgian example”.17 Thus, 
as in Belgium, the Annan Plan stated that the various levels of government would 
need to coordinate their stances in order to reach common positions to be represented 
at EU level. The Belgian model of domestic coordination is based on the consensus 
principle whereby each participating entity (i.e., each federal and federated 
representative) can potentially use its right of veto and thus block the coordination 
process. The price for Belgium of non-agreement at the domestic level is abstention in 
the EU Council of Ministers.   
 However, while the Annan Plan’s formulations on domestic coordination on 
EU matters are modelled on the Belgian example, those on representation in EU 
Councils are rather vague, departing from the Belgian model. Article 19(3), making 
use of the possibilities allowed for under Article 203 of the Treaty of the EU, stated: 
“Cyprus shall be represented in the EU by the common state government in its areas 
of competence or where a matter predominantly concerns an area of its competence. 
Where a matter falls predominantly or exclusively into an area of competence of the 
                                                                                                                                      
16 The Swiss constitution uses an even more ambiguous formula, referring to the cantons being 
sovereign within the limits of the Constitution.  
17 On the Belgian system of coordination see Bart Kerremans, “Determining a European Policy in a 
Multi-Level Setting: The Case of Specialized Co-oordination in Belgium”, Regional and Federal 
Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2000), pp. 36-61. 
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constituent states, Cyprus may be represented either by a common state or a 
constituent state representative, provided the latter is able to commit Cyprus” (our 
italics).18 This means that Cyprus, together with the Belgian, German and Austrian 
federations, would belong to the limited number of member states that can be 
represented at the EU level by federated entities.19 However, unlike with Belgium – 
where in areas of competence of the federated entities the Federation can be 
represented in the Council of Ministers only by these entities, acting as leaders of the 
Belgian delegation – the Annan Plan merely allows for the possibility of sub-state 
representation in EU Councils, without making it mandatory. In this respect the 
regulations in the Plan resemble the German and Austrian models of representation 
rather than the Belgian one. Nonetheless, the Plan does not rule out the further 
specification of these regulations. Various formal mechanisms of representation used 
by the federal states of Belgium, Germany or Austria in the multi-level EU setting 
could be taken into account when designing institutional solutions.  
 Under the ‘Annan Plan’, as in the case of Belgium, the implementation of EU 
laws and regulations would also be shared out in accordance with the internal division 
of powers. If, however, the constituent state level defaulted on its EU obligations, the 
common state level would be called upon to ensure the implementation of EU laws 
and regulations, even in policy matters that fell outside its sphere competence. By 
emulating this aspect of the Belgian model, the Annan Plan for Cyprus stepped up the 
role of the constituent state level, which would be entitled to exert its powers both 
within the common state and outside it (in Brussels).  
 The Annan Plan ensured that the implementation of the EU acquis 
communautaire would not become a hindrance to an agreement. Most of the 
provisions of the acquis would be implemented in EU member Cyprus. However, the 
original Annex V to the Annan Plan (later the Draft Act of Adaptation, attached to the 
Plan) set out a number of exemptions to the acquis, intended to allay Turkish Cypriot 
concerns about being overwhelmed by the larger and richer Greek Cypriot 
community. The exemptions were also included in order to retain the greatest possible 
balance between the rights in Cyprus of EU member state Greece and non-EU 
                                               
18 United Nations Secretary-General (2004), The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, Fifth Version, 
on http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org 
19 For a comparative analysis of the Belgian, German and Austrian systems of domestic coordination 
and representation at the EU level see Tamara Kovziridze, “Europeanization of Federal Institutional 
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member Turkey. Annex V was to be part of Cyprus’ Treaty of Accession, which 
would in turn have taken precedence over EU law.  
 In terms of the ‘three freedoms’, while freedom of movement would be 
liberalized immediately, there would be restrictions on the freedoms of settlement and 
property acquisition, to be phased out over time. The Turkish Cypriot authorities 
could restrict the rights of persons (who had not been residents for more than three 
years) to acquire property in northern Cyprus either for twenty years or for as long as 
the Turkish Cypriot state’s GDP per capita remained below 85% of that of the Greek 
Cypriot state. This would constitute a temporary exemption in the application of the 
acquis. 
In another temporary exemption to the acquis, residence rights for citizens 
hailing from the other constituent state would be limited according to a specified 
formula. In the first five years there would be a moratorium. In years six to nine, 
residence rights could be restricted if residents hailing from the other constituent state 
represented over 6% of the population of any given village or municipality. The 
quotas would rise to 12% in years 10-14, and then to 18% of the population of a 
constituent state until the nineteenth year (or until Turkey joined the EU). Thereafter, 
the constituent state could continue to apply residency restrictions on a non-
discriminatory basis in order to preserve its ‘identity’ (to ensure that no less than two-
thirds of their permanent residents spoke the official language of that constituent 
state). These safeguards would not entail permanent derogations to the acquis, in so 
far as the latter allows for restrictions to the implementation of the EU’s four 
freedoms if these are motivated for reasons of public security and are non-
discriminatory in nature.  
In addition to the effective exemptions to the acquis regarding intra-island 
freedom of ownership and residence, the Turkish Cypriot constituent state could adopt 
temporary economic ‘safeguard measures’ during the first six years of EU 
membership, if EU internal market laws threatened the economic development of 
northern Cyprus. 
The Plan also attempted to reassure Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots that the 
external balance (i.e., between Greece and Turkey) would be respected despite Greece 
and Cyprus’ EU membership. The retention of equal numbers of Greek and Turkish 
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troops (until Turkey’s EU membership), the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee 
and the exclusion of Cyprus from possible ESDP operations created a balance in the 
security and military sphere. In the economic sphere, the agreement stipulated that 
Cyprus would accord both Greece and Turkey ‘most favoured nation’ status and apply 
the rules of the EU-Turkey customs union.  
The Plan also attempted to retain a balance between Greece and Turkey in the 
spheres of property acquisition, residence and movement of persons, proposing to 
extend similar rights to Greek and Turkish nationals vis-à-vis Cyprus. For nineteen 
years or until Turkey’s EU membership, the right of Greek (Turkish) nationals to 
reside in Cyprus would be restricted if this figure amounted to more than 5% of the 
number of resident Greek Cypriot (Turkish Cypriot) constituent state citizens. These 
restrictions also accounted for Greek Cypriot concerns about the presence of Turkish 
settlers in northern Cyprus. The Plan also stated that Greek and Turkish nationals 
would receive equal treatment in their movements to and from Cyprus. The Plan did 
not specify whether this entailed Cyprus’ non-participation in the Schengen system, or 
whether additional benefits would be extended to Turkey in Cyprus, despite its non-
membership of the EU (and non-inclusion in the EU visa-free list). 
Let us now turn to the second dimension of the Europeanization of the Cyprus 
conflict, namely, the impact of the EU accession process on the domestic players. The 
question here is: to what extent, and through what mechanisms, were the features of 
the EU framework appreciated by the conflicting parties? And what, in turn, was the 
impact of the accession process on the principal parties to the conflict? When 
discussing the meaning of Europeanization in the Cyprus conflict, the starting point is 
the differentiated interpretation and value of Europeanization to the domestic players, 
who have different interests and different ideological standpoints. On these domestic 
players, Europeanization is having a dual effect. On the one hand, it has transformed 
their ideological and bargaining positions. This occurred both through a change in the 
domestic opportunity structure and through a more diffuse process of social learning 
(see Chapter 1). On the other hand, it has been used by the domestic players to 
legitimize their ideological positions and further their interests. Also worth 
emphasizing here is the fact that in Cyprus, owing to the imminent EU accession, 
‘Europeanization’ is synonymous with ‘EU-ization’.  
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 The EU accession process, particularly in its final stage (which coincided with 
the latest UN mediation efforts), had diverse effects on the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
political élites.20 It induced the more moderate forces in Cyprus to be more active in 
seeking a solution prior to accession, while it contributed to a covert hardening of the 
positions of the least flexible forces. Given the deadlines inherent in Cyprus’ EU 
accession timetable, those in favour of an early solution necessarily supported the 
Annan Plan as the basis of an agreement.  
 To begin with the Greek Cypriot side, it is important to note that the decision 
to apply for and pursue EU membership in the early 1990s was linked to the aim of 
strengthening the Greek Cypriot bargaining position in negotiations. First, the EU 
accession process and final EU membership would bolster the RoC’s status as the 
only legitimate government on the island, it would further discredit the TRNC, and it 
would provide the RoC with an additional forum in which to put forward its cause. 
Second, Cyprus’ accession process would increase Greek Cypriot leverage on Turkey 
both because of an expected rise in EU pressure on Turkey and because of Turkey’s 
own aspirations to join the Union. Third, EU membership would yield critical security 
gains to the Greek Cypriot community, given the unlikelihood of a Turkish attack on 
an EU member state. Finally, with the implementation of the acquis communautaire, 
EU membership would provide a framework for the liberalization of the freedoms of 
movement, property and settlement.  
 In terms of these factors, the EU accession process had diverse effects on the 
Greek Cypriot political élites. President Clerides appeared far more open to 
compromise in 2002-03 than he had been in 1993, when he ran for and won his first 
presidency on a bid to reject the Set of Ideas.21 Three key reasons appear to lie behind 
this change. The first reason is domestic. The different electoral alliances in the 
presidential campaigns of 1993 and 1998 partly explain Glafcos Clerides’ different 
rhetorical and substantive positions. The two other reasons are external, and deeply 
connected to the ongoing process of Europeanization in Cyprus. The EU accession 
                                               
20 On the problematic effect of the EU role in Cyprus see Thomas Diez (ed.), The European Union and 
the Cyprus Conflict - Modern Conflict, Post Modern Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2002); Nathalie Tocci, “Cyprus and the EU: Catalyzing Crisis or Settlement?”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, 
No. 2 (2000), pp. 105-138; and Christopher Brewin, The European Union and Cyprus (Huntingdon: 
Eothen, 2000). 
21 The Set of Ideas failed partly because of the changes demanded by the Turkish Cypriot side. 
However, the election campaign in southern Cyprus in 1993 – like the one in 2003, when the relatively 
more hardline candidate won the elections – was certainly detrimental to the peace process. 
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process and the immediate prospect of membership imbued the Greek Cypriot 
political élites with an increased sense of security. This increased the readiness of the 
moderate forces to make new concessions (such as accepting Turkey’s role in Cyprus’ 
security arrangements or accepting limits on the numbers of Greek Cypriot returnees. 
In this respect, lifting conditionality on the Greek Cypriot side in 1999 (i.e., allowing 
for the possibility of Cyprus’ accession without a settlement being a condition) may 
have had a positive influence on the positions of the former Greek Cypriot leader.  
 Europeanization has also had an indirect effect on Cyprus, through the 
ongoing Europeanization of Greece, especially in the realm of foreign policy. Being a 
Greek Cypriot nationalist in 2003 had a profoundly different meaning from what it 
did in 1993. And this was due to the transformation of Greece over the course of two 
decades of EU membership.22 EU membership aided the transformation of Greek 
governments at the level of discourse and mode of operation (e.g., increasingly 
accepting moderate positions and multilateral decision-making) as well as at the level 
of interest perception and understanding. In the realm of foreign policy, in particular, 
in 1999 the Simitis government made a historic U-turn in official Greek positions 
towards Turkey, advocating a policy of EU inclusion rather than exclusion. A Cyprus 
settlement would significantly reduce the chances of a serious rift in EU-Turkey 
relations, and – most importantly – it would consolidate the nascent Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement. Hence the relatively strong Greek support for the Annan Plan in 
2002-03, which in turn restrained Greek Cypriot (opposition) politicians in their 
criticism of the Plan.23  
 To the extent that, by 2002, the Greek Cypriot government was genuinely 
willing to reach a settlement, the accession deadline may have increased their 
incentives to clinch an early deal.24 While Greek Cypriot officials attached little 
importance to Turkish threats of annexation, they did appreciate that the international 
and domestic momentum generated in 2002 would evaporate in 2003 (as indeed it did, 
only to resurface in early 2004). If the chance to seal a deal prior to Cyprus’ EU 
                                               
22 See Panayiotis Ioakimidis, “The Europeanization of Greece: an Overall Assessment” in Kevin 
Featherstone and George Kazamias (eds), Europeanization and the Southern Periphery (London: Frank 
Cass, 2002). 
23 For example, at the 2002 Copenhagen European Council, the then Greek Cypriot opposition parties 
AKEL and DIKO moderated their criticism of the negotiating team for wanting to ‘sell off Cyprus’ 
after the support for the team’s approach expressed by the Greek government. 
24 William Wallace, Reconciliation in Cyprus: The Window of Opportunity (Florence: Mediterranean 
Programme Report, EUI, 2002). 
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accession was missed, despite the greater Greek Cypriot bargaining strength after 
their EU accession this strength could remain latent in the absence of inter-communal 
talks (at least until Turkey’s uncertain accession prospects became clearer). 
Furthermore, time could work against the Greek Cypriots, given the trends of Turkish 
Cypriot emigration from and Turkish immigration to the island. The EU ‘deadline’ 
may therefore have strengthened genuine Greek Cypriot determination to settle the 
conflict.  
 The same cannot be said, however, of the current Papadopoulous 
administration, in power since February 2003. As noted above, several Greek Cypriot 
analysts believe that, while Tassos Papadopoulous may have unwillingly accepted the 
Annan Plan at The Hague in March 2003, he became very reluctant to accept the 
original Plan in the aftermath of the signing of Accession Treaty in April of the same 
year.25 Having secured EU membership, and aided by the non-committal stance of the 
New Democracy government in Athens (in power since March 2004), Papadopoulous 
felt unconstrained in his flat rejection of the Annan Plan in April 2004. The President 
was well aware of the stronger Greek Cypriot bargaining position post-accession. In 
his rejection of the Plan, President Tassos Papadopoulous evidently felt that he would 
be able to use his increased bargaining strength post-membership to secure a more 
favourable agreement. Not only would member state Cyprus be able to exert pressure 
on Turkey by hindering its EU accession course – it would also be in a stronger 
position to reject any provisions that contravened the EU acquis. In other words, EU 
conditionality model II, which the EU adopted in 1999, and whereby the Union offers 
privileged access to the bigger entity only (see Chapter 1), had an adverse effect on 
the current Greek Cypriot leadership. In addition, following the actual entry of Cyprus 
into the EU in May 2004, many of the exemptions to the acquis included in Annex V 
of the Annan Plan would no longer be feasible, as they would not be incorporated into 
the Treaty of Accession.  
 The Greek Cypriot discourse used to criticize the provisions of Annex V of the 
Annan Plan is particularly interesting. Whereas in the past uncompromising positions 
were couched in the language of human rights and majoritarian democracy, the 
accession process allowed the far more specific and binding language of the acquis to 
legitimize inflexibility. The ceilings on the numbers of Greek Cypriots in northern 
                                               
25 Conversations with Greek Cypriot focus group participants, Nicosia, June 2003. 
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Cyprus, the limitations on the freedoms of settlement and property, the limits on the 
numbers of Greek nationals residing in Cyprus and the economic safeguards for the 
Turkish Cypriots are being criticized for being insufficiently ‘EU-ized’.  
Turning to the Turkish Cypriots, the EU accession process appeared to have its 
strongest negative effects between 1993 and 2001. They occurred because the 
presentation of costs and benefits of EU membership for their community was 
frequently based on misinformation about the EU or about existing practices within 
the Union. As a consequence, the benefits offered by EU membership were not valued 
enough by the Turkish Cypriot authorities for them to make concessions with a view 
to finding a solution. Throughout the accession period, moreover, Turkish Cypriot 
civil servants complained bitterly about the absence of adequate information from 
Commission officials, which led to the manipulation and misrepresentation of the 
accession process by those unwilling to see an agreement on the island.  
 The main incentive offered by the Commission to the Turkish Cypriots was 
economic. But in a context of international isolation stemming from embargoes and 
trade restrictions, the offer of conditional economic carrots had an adverse effect. The 
lure of economic incentives was branded a ‘bribe’ by several Turkish Cypriot and 
Turkish officials. They argued that the total aid on offer merely approximated to the 
annual transfers from Turkey (around $160-200 per year). They also argued that if 
Europeans had been genuinely concerned about the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots 
they would not have restricted trade since 1994. The 1994 European Court of Justice 
ruling, banning the export of products carrying Turkish Cypriot documentation, was 
interpreted as a deliberate and unethical attempt by ‘the EU’ to strangle the northern 
economy and force the Turkish Cypriots into compliance with Greek Cypriot 
demands. The EU still trades with Taiwan in spite of its non-recognition of Taiwan’s 
independence. Why, therefore, if not purely to exert pressure on the Turkish Cypriot 
side, did ‘the EU’ impose a trade embargo on the Turkish Cypriots? 
 Furthermore, the perceived zero-sum nature of Greek Cypriot gains from EU 
membership automatically made the Turkish Cypriot leadership view EU accession as 
a threat, thereby reducing their incentives to reach an agreement that would entail EU 
membership. What made matters worse was that, until late in 2001, EU players failed 
to convey the message that many of these perceived threats were in fact based on 
serious misconceptions of EU law and policy. It may be argued that those unwilling to 
reach an agreement knew that their positions were based on misreadings of the Union. 
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Yet had the Commission or the member states engaged in systematic information 
campaigns on possible ways of accommodating a settlement within the EU 
framework, they could have more easily discredited the uncompromising factions that 
bolstered their own positions through flawed reasoning.  
 Until late 2001, EU players did little to oppose the view that Cyprus’ EU 
membership would necessitate a strongly centralized state in order to speak with a 
single voice in the EU. The EU did not inform the Turkish Cypriot side about its 
framework’s potential to blur the distinctions between fully fledged statehood and 
highly autonomous federated entities. Several EU decisions, such as the 1994 
European Court of Justice ruling on the banning of Turkish Cypriot exports, 
highlighted the significance of recognized statehood. Commission officials also did 
nothing to discredit the Turkish Cypriot view that bi-zonality within the EU called for 
a confederal rather than a federal agreement. EU law guarantees freedoms between 
(rather than within) member states. So if, hypothetically, the two leaderships agreed to 
restrictions solely within a federal Cyprus, and entered the EU as a single member 
state, strictly speaking this would not necessitate exemptions from the acquis. 
Exemptions would be more necessary if two states or a confederation joined the 
Union.  
 Finally, the debate in northern Cyprus suffered from serious misinformation 
concerning the implications of membership for relations with Turkey. A Turkish 
argument made against Cyprus’ EU membership was that it would contravene the 
1960 provisions granting ‘most favoured nation’ status to the three guarantor powers. 
However, the joint membership of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in a customs union (as 
part of the Turkey-EU customs union) should automatically eliminate these concerns. 
The Turkish side also argued that EU membership would make any future Turkish 
security guarantee obsolete and that the EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) could be 
mobilized to expel Turkish troops from Cyprus. Yet the mandate of the RRF was not 
planned to extend beyond limited peace-keeping tasks. The idea of a hypothetical EU 
military intervention in Cyprus, against Turkey, was a myth that EU officials for too 
long failed to invalidate. 
 Because of these concerns, throughout the 1990s Turkish Cypriots and the 
TRNC establishment supported EU membership only after a settlement and/or after 
Turkey’s accession. Membership after a settlement in Cyprus would mitigate the 
potential threats from EU accession, while Cypriot membership together with Turkey 
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would provide additional security guarantees. Thus as Cyprus’ accession process went 
ahead while Turkey’s path to the EU was blocked, those Turkish Cypriots who 
supported EU membership only after Turkey’s entry became more reluctant to reach 
an agreement. To the most nationalist forces in northern Cyprus, moreover, the 
accession of a divided island was seen as a blessing in disguise. Several high-ranking 
officials argued that the accession of a divided Cyprus could settle the conflict on the 
basis of partition. Short of recognized independence, some officials would have been 
content with gradual integration into Turkey. In other words, as the Union gradually 
switched from conditionality model I (in 1993) to model II (in 1999) (see Chapter 1) 
vis-à-vis Cyprus, without an accession strategy for Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities became more unwilling to reach agreement on the reunification of the 
island.  
 The mounting pressure on Denktash in 2002-03 suggests that the lure of EU 
accession did generate important incentives amongst the Turkish Cypriot public. 
Indeed, the parliamentary elections in the north on 14 December 2003 led to an 
unprecedented victory by the opposition forces. According to the electoral results, the 
two parties on the nationalist side – the National Unity Party (UBP) led by former 
Prime Minister Dervis Eroglu and the Democrat Party (DP), led by Serdar Denktash, 
both of which were sceptical of the Annan Plan – won the same number of seats in the 
parliament as the two centre-left parties, the Republican Party (CTP) led by Mehmet 
Ali Talat and the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH) led by Mustafa Akinci, 
which had campaigned in favour of the Annan Plan and EU membership. Following 
the elections, a new government was formed in January 2004 between the centre-left 
(and pro-Annan Plan) CTP and the centre-right (and sceptical of the Annan Plan) DP. 
For the first time, centre-left leader Mehmet Ali Talat won the premiership in northern 
Cyprus. With the re-launch of the peace process in February 2004 and the failure to 
reach an agreement by March 2004, a large majority of the Turkish Cypriot 
community (by 65%) backed the Annan Plan (now finalized by the UN) in the 
separate referendum on 24 April 2004, despite its forceful rejection by the Turkish 
Cypriot President.  
What explains these crucial political dynamics in northern Cyprus? While the 
government continued to dismiss economic incentives as a cheap bribe designed to 
turn the people against their government, the appeal of EU membership nonetheless 
appeared to be gaining hold amongst the public. This was not least because the 
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economic situation in the north had steadily deteriorated since 1999. However, what 
apparently lay at the heart of the public’s concern was not simply the fear of poverty 
accentuated by the allure of EU-generated prosperity. It was rather the fear that 
economic ills and isolation would lead to their disappearance as a self-governing and 
well-defined community in northern Cyprus – that the Turkish Cypriots would 
disappear through emigration. These trends, they thought, would become exacerbated 
following Cyprus’ EU membership, as the Greek Cypriot government would make 
EU passports available to all Cypriots.  
 Another consequence of isolation was the increasing dependence on Turkey, 
which led to a growing sense among the Turkish Cypriot public that they were not 
democratically governing themselves but were being controlled by Ankara. More and 
more, they saw poverty and isolation not simply as ‘economic’ issues but also as 
factors related to security and identity. Increasingly, they came to view their self-
determination and communal security as depending on a solution and EU 
membership. In other words, the isolation of Turkish Cypriots increased their desire to 
accede to the Union, partly as a mechanism for securing democratic self-government 
in northern Cyprus.  
 The prospect of Turkey’s EU accession was also a critical factor in the 
mobilization of the Turkish Cypriot opposition and public in 2002-03. All Turkish 
Cypriot centre-left leaders agree that the mass mobilization would not have been 
possible without the launching of Turkey’s accession process after the December 
1999 Helsinki European Council.26  
 Finally, the mobilization of the public in support of EU membership was 
linked to the publication of the Annan Plan. The Plan showed how a solution and EU 
membership could satisfy basic Turkish Cypriot needs. In doing so, it laid to rest 
many Turkish Cypriot fears about EU membership.  
The last crucial dimension of the effects of the EU in Cyprus concerns Turkey. 
The prospect of Turkish accession has become somewhat clearer since the Helsinki 
European Council, in 1999. This improved the prospects for a settlement in Cyprus. 
The fundamental Turkish and EU ambivalence about Turkey’s EU membership, 
however, continued to have an adverse affect on conflict resolution efforts. Those in 
Turkey who were sceptical of Turkey’s EU membership (principally because of the 
                                               
26 Interviews with Turkish Cypriot opposition leaders, Nicosia, February 2002 and June 2003. 
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domestic transformation it would entail) vehemently rejected any link between a 
Cyprus settlement and Turkey’s accession. Nationalists argued that Cyprus was a 
national security issue, which could not be compromised for the sake of the EU. 
According to many analysts, nationalists and Eurosceptics relied on Turkish Cypriot 
‘intransigence’ to prevent a settlement in Cyprus. The absence of a settlement would 
erect a further barrier in EU-Turkey relations. This, in turn, would reduce EU pressure 
on Turkey to embark on difficult reforms, and it would provide an opportunity for it 
to annex northern Cyprus.  
 Those who instead genuinely favoured Turkey’s full membership were far 
readier to accept the linkage between a settlement and EU-Turkey relations, and as 
such became more willing to modify Turkish positions since Turkey was granted 
accession status in December 1999. The coming to power of the AKP (Justice and 
Development Party) in Turkey in 2002 led to the clearest change in the rhetoric of 
Turkey’s Cyprus policy. In sharp contrast to previous administrations, the AKP 
government was willing to acknowledge openly the link between Turkey’s accession 
process and a settlement.  
 Yet even after the 1999 Helsinki European Council, at which Turkey was 
accorded EU candidate status, the insufficient credibility of EU policies on Turkey 
strengthened the arguments of nationalist and Eurosceptic forces in Turkey and 
northern Cyprus, who argued against an early settlement within the EU. Moderates in 
Turkey accepted the fact that, because of Turkey’s own shortcomings, Cyprus would 
join the EU before Turkey. However, they could not accept that, because of 
unchangeable features of the Turkish state and society (e.g., culture, religion and 
geography), Cyprus would mark the borders of a united Europe, keeping Cyprus and 
Turkey on opposite sides of the European divide. Hence, the more EU attitudes and 
decisions fed Turkish mistrust of the Union, and the less credible the positions of 
Turkish moderates became, the less well-disposed Turkey became towards a 
resolution of the conflict. In December 2002, the government felt that a Cyprus 
settlement within the EU would amount to ‘losing Cyprus’. Events showed that the 
EU’s Copenhagen offer to review (in December 2004) the possibility of starting 
accession negotiations with Turkey was insufficient to induce Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriots to sign an agreement at that point in time. This failure was not only caused 
by flawed Turkish bargaining tactics, but was fundamentally linked to Turkey’s 
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mistrust of Europe. Pressure alone was insufficient to persuade Turkey into an 
agreement.  
 This is not to say that Turkey decided against a solution within the EU. 
Throughout 2003, trends in Turkey continued to oscillate. Those sceptical of Turkey’s 
future in Europe persisted in their opposition to Cyprus’ EU membership, and 
consequently their opposition to the UN Plan. Those in favour of Turkey’s EU 
membership, but dissatisfied with the Copenhagen decision, proposed postponing a 
settlement until Turkey’s EU prospects became clearer (i.e., in December 2004). 
Other pro-Europeans pushed instead for an early settlement based on the UN Plan. 
They appreciated the difficulty of reaching a favourable agreement after Cyprus’ 
accession to the EU (May 2004) and understood that in future the international 
burden, and EU conditionality in particular, would be placed on Turkey’s shoulders.  
 By February 2004, those in Turkey pushing for an early settlement appeared to 
gain the upper hand. With the formation of the government in northern Cyprus, the 
National Security Council in Turkey convened a meeting on Cyprus in late January 
2004. The meeting resulted in a Turkish (and Turkish Cypriot) commitment to re-
launch direct negotiations and to use the Annan Plan as a ‘reference’ for an agreement 
(note: not as the ‘basis’ of’ an agreement). However, shortly afterwards, Turkish 
Prime Minister Erdogan went a step further, when, during a World Economic Summit 
meeting in Davos, he declared to Kofi Annan that the UN Secretary-General had the 
authority to ‘fill in the blanks’ if the parties failed to agree on changes to the Plan. The 
Secretary-General then convened the parties in New York to draw up the timetable for 
negotiations.  
 In New York the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sides made a remarkable 
proposition. They presented a three-stage timetable for reaching an agreement before 
Cyprus’ accession on 1 May. The first stage would see a re-launch of negotiations 
between the two Cypriot leaderships, aimed at reaching an agreement on the basis of 
the Plan. In the second stage (if the first stage had not resulted in an agreement), 
Greece and Turkey would intervene, again attempting to reach a mutually agreed 
solution. In the third and final stage (again assuming the absence of an agreement), 
the Secretary-General would add the final touches to the Plan which would then be 
submitted to the two communities in separate referenda (and then to the parliaments 
of Greece and Turkey). 
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Throughout the three-stage process, the Turkish government remained 
committed to its pledges, and indeed supported the final version of the Annan Plan 
submitted to separate referenda. While this did not entail a consensus within the elites, 
the government’s ability to pursue its stance clearly pointed to a decisive shift in the 
balance of power within the establishment. 
This argument suggests that while the stick of Cyprus’ accession proved 
insufficient to generate Turkish willingness to seek a solution, the carrot of Turkey’s 
own accession process, together with a change in Turkey’s domestic political 
dynamics, triggered a shift in Turkey’s state policies on Cyprus. A greater Turkish 
readiness to settle the conflict under the AKP government is evident. This is largely 
due to the government’s unprecedented commitment to EU accession (manifested also 
by its perseverance in pursuing domestic reforms). It is also due to the link made by 
EU actors between EU-Turkey relations and conflict settlement. However, without the 
more credible EU commitments to Turkey since 1999, and particularly since 
December 2002, the stick of the linkage (between a settlement and Turkey’s accession 
process) would probably have had limited effect.  
The EU had an impact on the Cyprus conflict both directly, as a result of EU 
conditionalities linked to the accession process, and through endogenous processes of 
social change within the main parties, which were also partly induced by EU 
accession. Where Cyprus’ EU accession process is concerned, during the 1990s the 
Union switched from conditionality model I to conditionality model II. This may have 
had some positive effects on the previous Greek Cypriot leadership, imbuing them 
with a greater sense of security. But on the whole it did not lead to a moderation of 
Greek Cypriot positions, and it certainly reduced the current Greek Cypriot 
government’s incentives to reach an early solution.  
 Nor did the switch to conditionality model II lead to a moderation in the 
positions of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, although it did trigger key domestic 
political dynamics in northern Cyprus by the turn of the century. The positions of the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership hardened over the course of the 1990s. Trends have 
altered since late 2001, and the results of the parliamentary elections in the north on 
14 December 2003 certainly point to a distinct and unprecedented rise in the 
popularity of the opposition forces, and in particular their stance on a solution and EU 
accession, as also attested by the referendum results.  
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 EU conditionality has appeared to produce some of its intended effects in the 
last three years, as Cyprus reached the end of its path to accession and, perhaps even 
more importantly, Turkey’s accession process began, in December 1999. However, 
the problems that have plagued EU-Turkish relations since 1999 have also clouded 
the prospects for a Cyprus settlement. In particular, EU-Turkey relations are marked 
by two problems: time inconsistency and the different value of EU benefits as 
perceived by different domestic players (see Chapter 1). Concessions from candidate 
Turkey are demanded before the delivery of the actual benefits. This in turn creates 
uncertainty in Turkey and induces Turkish policy-makers to delay perceived 
concessions until the delivery of benefits is closer and more certain. Furthermore, 
Turkish foreign policy depends heavily on who gains the upper hand within the 
Turkish establishment and how highly these players value the prospect of EU 
accession. 
 The second – and in the long run perhaps even more important – form of 
domestic change over the course of the last decade is related to the process of social 
learning (see Chapter 1). What can be concluded is that the first positive signs of 
transformation in the attitudes and perceived interests within Greece, Turkey and 
Cyprus may be slowly emerging. In Greece this was manifest in the PASOK 
government’s support for the Secretary-General’s 2002 proposals and for Turkey’s 
gradual integration into the Union. Following the March 2004 elections in Greece, it 
remains to be seen whether this Greek transformation was restricted to the previous 
government or whether it affects the Greek political system as a whole (and thus also 
the current New Democracy government). In southern Cyprus it was most evident in 
the positions of Glafcos Clerides’ team, while being shared less by the general public. 
In northern Cyprus, the opposite was true, with a public far ahead of its leadership 
when it came to revising its positions on desirable future options. In Turkey, while 
internal consensus has not yet consolidated, the first signs of change emerged with the 
rise to power of the AKP government in Ankara. In these gradual and endemic 
processes of transformation, or ‘Europeanization’, the role of the EU as an anchor is 
clearly a vital one. 
 
2.5 Possible outcomes in the near future 
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For those pushing for an early settlement within the EU – on both sides of the Green 
Line, in Greece and in Turkey – the Annan Plan remains the only game in town. 
Thanks both to its level of detail and to its tightly inter-related (albeit imperfect) 
compromise arrangements, any alternative that differs substantially from the current 
proposal cannot be realistically negotiated in the short-term. An early solution would 
mean that, regardless of whether resumed negotiations lead to mutually agreed 
changes to the Plan, either a slightly modified Plan would be re-put to referendum on 
both sides of the island; or the existing fifth version of the Plan would be re-put to 
referendum in southern Cyprus only.    
The Annan Plan is the only possible ‘solution’ in the short term. With the 
rejection of the Plan by the Greek Cypriot side, however, it is unlikely that a peace 
process will be re-launched any time soon. First, it would be difficult to persuade the 
UN Secretariat to re-engage in the peace process, following the successive failures of 
March 2003 and April 2004. Second, assuming a peace process is re-launched, unless 
a significantly different Plan is put forward, the existing Annan Plan is unlikely to be 
accepted by the Greek Cypriot community (given that public opinion would have to 
be shifted by over 25%). Third, even if a different Plan, more favourable to the Greek 
Cypriot side, was put forward, it is unlikely that the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish sides 
would accept it. Above it was shown how the internal balance within northern Cyprus 
and Turkey has tilted, in favour of more moderate forces. However, this is not to say 
that there is not strong opposition to this more moderate stance. Accepting a Plan that 
came closer to satisfying Greek Cypriot interests at a perceived cost to the Turkish 
Cypriots is probably something the current authorities in both northern Cyprus and 
Turkey could not do.  
So what are the possible default outcomes? One solution could be that, in the 
future, the Greek Cypriot side would succeed in pushing through a far more ‘federal’ 
solution, i.e., one resembling its 1989 proposals far more than the current UN Plan. 
Under the 1989 proposals from the RoC National Council, a federal Republic of 
Cyprus would unambiguously represent the continuation of the existing Republic of 
Cyprus, which would federalize through the adoption of a new constitution. A greater 
number of powers (than those envisaged by the Annan Plan) would be held by the 
centre, and this in turn would be reflected in the representation of Cyprus in the EU 
Council of Ministers. Perhaps most crucially, the Greek Cypriot side would like to 
abolish – or at the very least reduce – the restrictions imposed both on the return of 
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refugees and on the freedoms of settlement and property acquisition. This in turn 
could lead to a faster return to the pre-1974 situation of ethnically mixed territories. 
Finally, this solution would see the faster and more extensive withdrawal of Turkish 
troops and settlers, the existence of clearer international guarantees of the 
implementation of the Plan, and a further dilution – if not abolition – of Turkish 
guarantees.   
 Such a solution could materialize with a strengthening of the Greek Cypriot 
bargaining position and a weakening of that of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. A 
stronger bargaining position on the Greek Cypriot side would result from the RoC’s 
accession to the EU in May 2004. A weakening of Turkey’s bargaining strength 
would occur if the EU exerted full conditionality on Turkey regarding a resolution of 
the conflict, irrespective of the failure of the 2004 peace process due to the Greek 
Cypriot stance. However, for such a form of pressure to be effective, two interrelated 
conditions would need to be satisfied. First, a consensus in Turkey would need to 
consolidate around the imperative of EU membership and the fulfilment of all the 
necessary conditions for achieving it (including almost any Cyprus solution). 
Secondly, it would require a credible commitment from the member states, whereby, 
if Turkey fulfils its conditions, it will be accepted as a full EU member. As of today, 
we are far from achieving this double consensus. 
 If this double consensus does not materialize in the medium term, then Cyprus 
may drift towards a consolidation of the Green Line. At the time of writing, in May 
2004, this appears the most likely scenario. This could result either in the gradual (de 
facto) integration of northern Cyprus into Turkey, a scenario which neither the current 
Turkish government nor the Turkish Cypriot people support, or in some form of 
continuation of the status quo. The viability of the status quo in northern Cyprus will 
depend to a large extent on the approach taken by the international community, in 
particular the EU. Under the existing circumstances of complete political and 
economic isolation, the status quo could evolve into an increasing Turkification of 
northern Cyprus (through the emigration of Turkish Cypriots to western Europe and 
immigration of Turks to the island). If, however, EU member states reach the 
conclusion that such a scenario would not be in their interests, action may be taken to 
break the isolation of the north (i.e., through the lifting of trade restrictions and 
embargoes).  
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 The first steps in this direction are being taken. Following the failure of the 
peace process, the EU decided to grant €259 million in aid to the Turkish Cypriot 
community, i.e., the amount that was allocated to northern Cyprus under a 
reunification scenario. The Council also decided to accept Turkish Cypriot exports 
with Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce certification and EU supervision. 
However, these steps remain far from representing a normalization of economic 
relations with northern Cyprus. The Taiwan precedent indicates that international 
recognition is not a necessary condition for economic normalization. However, in an 
EU context (or rather, in a context in which, legally, Cyprus is wholly admitted to the 
Union but de facto northern Cyprus is excluded) it remains unclear how normalization 
would be achieved. Nonetheless, if the necessary political will is found within the 
enlarged EU, and the latter makes good on its promises not to leave the Turkish 
Cypriots out into the cold, then innovative means to truly normalize the situation of 
the north could be found. And this indeed may be the best way to foster and prepare 
the ground for a future reunification of the island, an aim which remains in the 
interests of all internal and external parties to the conflict.  
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